Remarks, Symposium, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order by Shaffer, Thomas L.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 4 Article 3 
1998 
Remarks, Symposium, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order 
Thomas L. Shaffer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas L. Shaffer, Remarks, Symposium, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 1089 
(1998). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Remarks, Symposium, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order 
Cover Page Footnote 
Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre Dame; supervising attorney, Notre 
Dame Legal Aid Clinic. I am grateful for the assistance of Joseph Bauer, Samuel W. Calhoun, Linda 
Harrington, Russell Pearce, Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Nancy J. Shaffer, Jay Tidmarsh, and John Howard Yoder. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3 
FAITH TENDS TO SUBVERT LEGAL ORDER
Thomas L. Shaffer*
We are an incarnate people ... a people of inculturation. Our faith
lives in and through the cultures we inhabit.... Inculturation is not
the same as "acculturation." To become acculturated is to capitu-
late to the wisdom, myths, and reality of a culture. It reduces the
faith to a... function of ethnicity or ideology.... Faith must always
resist acculturation, or it will have nothing to say to the world or to
the culture.
John F. Kavanaugh'
m WO old friends and colleagues died in the spring of 1997. Both
x share with me a Baptist boyhood and a Roman Catholic middle
age. Both showed me that the relevance of religion to a lawyer's work
is best approached with believers' irony.
Frank Booker, descendant of Cherokee Indians, Missouri farmers,
railroaders, and Baptist ministers, taught law at Stetson and then No-
tre Dame, with a style all his own and with a steady eye on how im-
portant the law is. After his funeral, one of his students remembered
for me a day in Frank's first-year torts class. They were several weeks
into law school and were full of the majesty of Cardozo's Palsgraf
opinion-hell-bent on acculturation into the law. Frank summoned
up his preacher's voice for them: "Remember," he said, "the common
law is no friend of the common man."
Bill Lewers was a Holy Cross priest. He taught at Kentucky and
Illinois before he became a Roman Catholic and found his way to
Notre Dame. Somebody once asked him why he became a Catholic.
He said he came in because he believed in the social teachings of the
Church. And then, he said, he looked around and found out he was
the only one who did.
The honor I owe my friends moves me to what I hope is a radical
point for this project. The point is this: Faith tends to subvert legal
order. Or, as Bill Lewers would say-it doesn't much, but it should.
I need to make some distinctions that will recognize the importance
in my catholic tradition of the medieval Scholastics: "Seldom affirm,"
they said, "never deny, always distinguish."
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre
Dame; supervising attorney, Notre Dame Legal Aid Clinic. I am grateful for the
assistance of Joseph Bauer, Samuel W. Calhoun, Linda Harrington, Russell Pearce,
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Nancy J. Shaffer, Jay Tidmarsh, and John Howard Yoder.
1. John F. Kavanaugh, SJ., The Word Encountered 68 (1996).
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First distinction: Between the government's problem with religion
and religion's problem with the government. I take it our business
together is religion's problem with the government. That is not a radi-
cal point, but it might warn the church-state types that they may have
come to the wrong meeting.
Second distinction: Between American civil religion and the faith
of Jews and Christians-that is, between what religious people do
when they put the stars and stripes next to the altar or pulpit, as distin-
guished from what they do when they worship the God of Moses, Mo-
hammed, and Jesus. That is a radical point only if you are inclined to
worship idols.'
To get, then, to the radical part: First, an image and an example. A
meeting of protesting Christians in Zurich in October, 1523.
The Protestant Reformation was underway there. A priest named
Huldryck Zwingli was commissioned by the city fathers to preach and
to preside at religious disputations. He gathered a group of pastors
and theologians to discuss the difference between the Lord's supper
and the mass. They came to some conclusions, and Zwingli said he
would submit their conclusions for implementation by the city fathers.
A priest named Simon Stumpf objected. He said seeking approval
of the law was contrary to scripture. He cited the way the first Jewish
Christians decided what to do, in the Acts of the Apostles, and said:
"[T]he decision has already been made, the Spirit of God [in the con-
gregation] decides."3 He accepted the consensus of the circumstantial
congregation of Christians in Zurich. He rebelled in saying that turn-
ing to government was not the way to work out the implications of
faith. His position was subversive of legal order-of Catholic Chris-
tendom, as well as the order of the mainline Reformation.4
Stumpf, Conrad Grebel, and the other radical reformers of Zurich
concluded that Christianity had been wrong since the Fourth century
of the Common Era, from and after the conversion to Christianity of
the Emperor Constantine. The mistake of the Fourth Century Chris-
tians, and of Lutherans, Calvinists, and Zwinglians in the sixteenth,
was to turn the church over to the government.'
2. My daughter Mary and I attempted to describe this distinction biblically in the
last chapter of our book American Lawyers and Their Communities (1991). We sug-
gest there what I depend on here, in making this second distinction-that is, that, for
modern "first-world" people, idolatry is not the worship of trees and little dolls, but of
what we care about. Id. at 209-17. As Walter Brueggemann says: "It is a mark of
discernment and maturity to strip life down to one compelling loyalty, to be freed of
all the others that turn out to be idolatrous." Walter Brueggeman, The Threat of Life:
Sermons on Pain and Weakness 92 (1996).
3. William R. Estep, The Anabaptist Story 12 (1984).
4. Id. at 8-17.
5. Id. My sources, in addition to Estep, supra note 3, are J. Denny Weaver, Be-
coming Anabaptist (1987); John Howard Yoder, Gospel Renewal and the Roots of
Nonviolence, Faith and Freedom, Dec. 1995, at 5, along with other material from to
Yoder's work, cited infra; J. Lawrence Burkholder, Nonresistance, Nonviolent Resist-
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The radical reformers proposed a free church of adult members,
and they were pacifists. They rejected infant baptism, violence, and
what they called "the sword." Rejection of infant baptism subverted
the legal order of medieval Christendom and of the Reformation, in
both of which all subjects of the state were Christians and all Chris-
tians were subjects of the state.6 Rejection of the sword subverted a
fundamental principle of almost all Christians then and ever since, and
of Jews since the Enlightenment: that the faithful should be willing to
kill for legal order. (Some radical reformers were put to death for
saying that capital punishment was wrong.7)
If there was any doubt about how subversive those first Anabaptists
were seen to be, it was removed by the persistent slaughter of them by
the establishment-Catholic princes in some places, and, in Swvitzer-
land and elsewhere, by "magisterial" Protestants. It has been hard for
me, tamed as I am by Enlightenment tolerance, to understand the
murderous rage of 16th Century mainline Christians against the radi-
cal reformers. The persistent and sadistic slaughter of those who
peacefully undertook to revive a "believers church" astonishes me. I
ance, and Power, in Kingdom, Cross, and Community 131 (John Richard Burkholder
& Calvin Redekop eds., 1976); and Ronald J. Sider, Christian Ethics and the Good
News of the Kingdon" Doing Christian Ethics in an Eschatalogical Key, in Terry L
Brensinger & E. Morris Sider, Within the Perfection of Christ 13 (1990).
6. The late Lutheran theologian Helmut Thielicke implied this as the politics of
the "magisterial" Reformation, and, in retrospect, had what I take to be mainline
Lutheran doubts about it: "Perhaps, as we think back on the past millennium, we
never wanted anything like a Christian culture and Christian states in which every-
body was automatically dumped into the big sack of Christendom and included as a
matter of course among the possessors of baptismal certificates simply by being born
and by the operation of ecclesiastical custom, even though they had no personal rela-
tionship whatever to Jesus of Nazareth. And perhaps we owe it to the goodness of
God that all this crumbled away in our hands and continues to do so." Christ and the
Meaning of Life 61 (John W. Doberstein trans. 1962); see also David M. Smolin, A
House Divided? Anabaptist and Lutheran Perspectives on the Sword, 47 J. Legal Educ.
28, 29-31 (1997).
There is fruitful disagreement between Christian theologians who regard the legal
enterprise as alien (although not always hostile) to their communal loyalties, and
those who regard the legal enterprise as capable of significant change-between, that
is, the theology of the believers' church, the descendants of the sixteenth century
Anabaptists, and both Marxist Christian theory and the theology of liberation.
John Howard Yoder focused the disagreement on the primordial creation (or call-
ing) of a believing community:
The form of liberation in the biblical witness ... the creation of a confessing
community which is viable without or against the force of the state, and does
not glorify that power structure even by the effort to topple it. The content
of liberation in the biblical witness is not the 'nation-state' or the 'class-state'
brotherhood engineered after the take-over but the covenantal peoplehood
already existing because God has given it, and sure of its future because of
the Name ('identity') of God, not because of a coming campaign ...
[P]ilgrim peoplehood is projected by the Bible as the shape of salvation in
any age.
John Howard Yoder, Liberating Comes First: Exodus Precedes Sinai 9-10 (1972).
7. Estep, supra note 3, at 47.
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won't describe the killing. Believe me, it was as hate-filled and cruel
as 20th Century examples we might think of.8
I suppose there is an analogy here, in the 20th Century, to the non-
violent religious witness of Gandhi and Dr. King. The guns of the
British colonial rulers in India, and the fire hoses and police dogs in
Birmingham, were responses to Gandhi's and King's subversion of
legal order.9 And there, as in 16th Century Europe, the response of
those who manage legal order was vigorous and ugly.
8. Smolin, supra note 6, at 31-32, describes some of it. My friend and teacher,
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., points out that some of these persecutors probably regarded the
Anabaptists as child abusers: The fate of an infant who died in infancy, unbaptized,
was limbo in Catholic theology, hell in Protestant theology. But Rodes is enough of a
liberation theologian to see that rationale as supportive of an ideology of oppression.
The Anabaptists at the time also saw it that way. Melchior Rinck, in a letter written
circa 1530, said, "[B]oth the work-saints [Roman Catholics] and the scribes [magiste-
rial reformers] strive so mightily concerning infant baptism.., not ... out of love for
the children, for they are precisely the ones who consume the bread that belongs to
the children and to the poor orphans, and fatten themselves on it ..... "Translated and
quoted in John Howard Yoder, The Legacy of Michael Sattler 136 (1973).
9. Professor Eugene W. Harper of the Fordham University Law Faculty pointed
out that Dr. King invoked an argument against unjust law that resembled that of St.
Thomas Aquinas, which is to say that Dr. King's Christian witness was not Anabaptist
in the sense I am describing here. That would be true as well, I suppose, of Gandhi. I
invoke both as analogues, to make the argument that their exercise of faith tended to
subvert legal order. It would be interesting to explore the differences they would
have had with the Anabaptists on the moral authority of legal order, but that is not
my purpose here. It makes my point to say that the tendency of religious witness in all
three cases-the effect of it-the way it was seen by the managers of the law-was
subversion of legal order.
Religious witness subverts not only legal order, but also the order of organized
religion to the extent organized religion supports legal order. A recent minor theme
in the resurgence of interest in religion in America has been religious judgment on the
Roman Catholic Church's failure to maintain a clear witness against social injustice.
Such a passionate servant of fairness as Len Deighton's Bernie Samson is thus moved
to say, "[E]very dedicated Catholic I know says he's lapsed." Len Deighton, Hope 258
(1995). Recent instances that echo for me the ironic observation of my late friend Bill
Lewers: Rembert G. Weakland, "Economic Justice for All" Ten Years Later, America,
Mar. 22, 1997, at 8; Denis Murphy, Wanted: Both Democracy and Theology of Libera-
tion, America, Mar. 29, 1997, at 4; Moises Sandoval, An "Old Prophet" Rattles the
Status Quo, Nat'l Cath. Rep., Dec. 27, 1996, at 18 (referring to Archbishop Patricio
Flores).
It is possible to lay the neglect of social justice among Christians at the door of
academic theology. Luke Timothy Johnson, a respected academic theologian, thus
speaks of his discipline as being "less about God than about the politics of identity or
linguistic halls of mirrors.... Even those who seek to retrieve the theological enter-
prise find themselves in the infinite regress apparently demanded by academic rigor."
Luke Timonthy Johnson, Explaining God Away, Commonweal, Dec. 20, 1996, at 18.
(Thank God that no such observation could be made about legal academics.) My
friend and teacher John Howard Yoder would, I think, join Professor Johnson more
as an ally than a critic. See, for examples of Yoder's steady argument, within aca-
demic theology, for what Johnson seems to find missing, The Christian Witness to the
State (1964), and Nevertheless: The Varieties of Religious Pacifism (1971). Yoder's
most systematic and relatively popular works are The Politics of Jesus (1972) (2d ed.
1994), and The Priestly Kingdom (1984).
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The believers' church sought to follow Jesus by not being violent.
That tended to subvert legal order not because the believers church
aimed at subversion but because the law would not let them go. They
offended the law when they refused civil offices that involved force.
They offended in theory when they said they could not obey the state
but were willing to be subject to it. That is, they rejected its ideology
but did not resist either its claim to power or its lethal force.
They did not resist its claim to power. They did not, that is, oppose
the law; their subversive effect was in not accepting the ideology of
the law, the rule of law. When legal rules offended their biblical faith,
their position was either to disobey and be killed, or to be subject to
what the government wanted. On the one hand, they did not enroll
their children in Christendom. On the other hand, they paid their
taxes. Such a novel distinction meant that they had to decide, among
themselves, whether they were going to support what the government
was up to, or ignore it (when they could), or go along with it. It pro-
posed a novel political theology, and, even more radically, with Sa-
muel Stumpf, it proposed a procedure for giving direction to its
political theology.
A friend of mine, a legal-aid lawyer and a Mennonite, put it this
way: "There are some things we do." She "seeks the peace of the
city" in which the Lord has put her, to quote the prophet Jeremiah
(29:7), and that opens to her talent and energy all sorts of civic en-
deavor, from political reform to schools to protecting the environ-
ment. It gives her something to do as a lawyer, as a legal-aid lawyer in
this case.10
10. Her believers' church does not suppose, to quote Robert E. Rodes, Jr., that it
is "an... exclusive location of liberating events." Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Law and
Liberation 4 (1986). Rosemary Radford Ruether, suggests that "seeking the peace of
the city," even as a lawyer, is not limited to the inoffensive but can be prophetic-
both in its confrontation of the law and in its confrontation of modem organized
religion:
The prophetic paradigm not only criticized unjust and oppressive power but
also criticized the use of religion to sacralize such oppressive power. This
shift in the social location of religion is the root of the Marxist critique of
religion. Both the prophets and the gospels decry the use of law or ritual...
without regard to social concern for justice and mercy.... It is a self-criti-
cism that aims at the renewal of the ethical content of religious practice.
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Feminist Spirituality and Historical Religion, Harvard
Divinity Bulletin, Mar. 1986, at 5,
The mainline church preserves a theology (an ecclesiology) that limits what it is
willing to do, so that "seeking the peace of the city" is not in theory (whatever it is in
practice in modern nation-states) sub-cultural. In the Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modem World, for example: "[E]arthly progress must be carefully
distinguished from the growth of Christ's kingdom, to the extent that the former can
contribute to the better ordering of human society, it is of vital concern to the King-
dom of God." Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modem World, at para. 39 (1965). My colleague Brian E. Daley, SJ., speaks thus of
Christians "bringing justice, mutual reverence, and peaceful unity to the world."
Brian E. Daley, Judgment Day or Jubilee? Approaching the Millennium, America,
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Most of the modern descendants of the radical reformers are sepa-
rate because they are separated by modem cultures of deviance. They
are pushed aside. They are nonetheless "loving critics of the status
quo," in Ronald Sider's characterization. They "live as a new model
in the very heart of the perverted culture, pointing by their words and
life to God's alternative ... a visible model of shalom far ahead of
surrounding society in its concrete manifestation of right relationships
among people.""
Rabbi Lawrence Kushner provides a parallel from modem Judaism,
an example of shalom ahead of the surrounding society, in his amiable
book about the patriarch Jacob, whom the Lord named Israel: A
member of Rabbi Kushner's congregation in Massachusetts, an emi-
grant from the Soviet Union, told him about what the members of the
congregation in Leningrad used to do on Simchat Torah. They
danced, not in the synagogue, as is customary in Massachusetts, but in
the street in front of the synagogue-so that the law would see them
and impose legal sanctions on them. "So you see," he said, "to dance
on such an occasion, this is a different kind of dance."'" The brave
Jews in Leningrad were like the radical reformers in Zurich, who
openly baptized adults. 3
May 31, 1997, at 20. He concludes a careful discussion of Jewish and Christian apoca-
lypticism: "Jesus is struggling with us, promising to come again in glory, but calling us
to share now in his labor of loving and healing this fragile and sinful world." Id. at 21.
The critical question, then, as I see it, and as I think my friend the Mennonite legal-aid
lawyer would, is the forum and the process for deciding what Christians are called to
do at particular times and places in a nation's history.
11. Sider, supra note 5, at 27-28. Sider identifies the prophetic witness of the be-
lievers' church, which is to be distinguished from its "sectarian" attempt to preserve
its integrity within a legal order it regards as legitimate-even divinely decreed-but
alien to its purposes. A secular analogue that might help illustrate the latter half of
that distinction is the way women in Victorian fiction coped in unfortunate marriages.
Consider, for example, a comparison of the principal female characters in George
Eliot's Middlemarch: Rosamond consents to male domination and pretends in a devi-
ous way to obey her husband, but she is not subordinate. The more admirable wife in
the story, Dorothea Brooke, is subordinate to her husband Causabon, and to the con-
ventions of Victorian marriage, but retains her integrity and, within her integrity, de-
velops the virtues subordination requires. The effect of her practice of these virtues,
as it turns out, is to subvert Causabon's vain project. George Eliot, Middlemarch
(Mod. Libr. ed. 1994).
12. Lawrence Kushner, God Was in This Place & I, I Did Not Know 91-92 (1991).
13. The theological beginning of Anabaptism is probably the Schleitheim declara-
tion of 1527; that was also a religious (ecclesiological) beginning, in that, after
Schleitheim, the believers' church was openly separate-with separate congregations
and separate pastors. Burkholder and Weaver fix the religious beginning 22 years
earlier, on January 21, 1525. The council in Zurich had ordered the baptism of all
babies within eight days of birth. The radical reformers promptly held a meeting-
relatively public, apparently-at which a group of adults were, one by one, baptized.
This ceremony took place in the home of Anna Mantz; her son George was the first
Anabaptist martyr-killed by public authority, in her presence, shortly after and be-
cause of the baptisms. Burkholder, supra note 5, at 36, 50; Weaver, supra note 5, at 47.
The radical reformers, as part of the doctrine of discipleship (following Jesus's exam-
ple), taught that such suffering was a consequence of faith-even a test of it-notably
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These subversive actions, subversive because of the law's reaction
to them, are communal; their meaning is communal. "Only God's re-
lationship to Israel gives significance to our lives, and only when fear
is rooted in significance is it worthy of our human energy," 4 Rabbi
David R. Blumenthal says. "Meaning is a function of chosenness, not
an assumption of personal judgment.""
"[T]he primordial ethical obligation," as John Howard Yoder put it
in reference to the primitive church, "is the cohesion of the believing
community in the face of the pressures working against its identity....
[T]he claim to be the only bearers of truth, which is ecumenical bad
manners in our pluralistic and tolerant setting, is a simple fact when
(in your eyes) your survival is the only way for the honor of the only
true God to be upheld in your corner.' 6
The Anabaptists of Zurich are an example from history of the rele-
vance of religion to a lawyer's work. I commend it to you, if not for
emulation, then, because, as Holmes said of Mephistopheles, there is
something to be said for the intellect that is not humbugged by a
phrase. It keeps the green scum off the pond, he said.
The Bible provides a second way. If you open the Bible at random
ten times, you will find that half the texts you see say that God is a
God of justice, that He hates injustice, and that He hears the cry of
those who suffer from the injustice of the law. The Bible's emphasis
on justice thus tends to subvert legal order. This radical meaning of
biblical justice has been tamed by institutional religion, because it is
too drastic to support a comfortable partnership with legal order.
Radical meaning here is also far beyond what democratic liberal poli-
tics and "the veil of ignorance" have come up with, by way of consid-
ering, for example, the situation of the underclass in the legal order of
bureaucratic capitalism.
Biblical justice has not been useful for, say, welfare reform. In both
liberal and religious sentiment, the conventional meaning of biblical
justice has been reduced to debilitating safety nets or admonitions to
charity, to calls for points of light-which leads to Boy Scout food
drives on Sunday mornings and to social and economic arrangements
that oppress the poor. Those things are what the ruling class in
America, which includes all of those who benefit from the rule of
because such actions as the forming of new congregations, and baptizing adults, in-
vited the scrutiny of the law.
14. David R. Blumenthal, God at the Center 19 (1988).
15. Id
16. John Howard Yoder, Ethics and Esdatology, 6 Ex Auditu 120, 123 (1990). A
similar argument, from a somewhat more mainline Protestant perspective, is in James
Win. McClendon, Jr., Ethics: Systematic Theology, ch. 8 (1986).
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law-all of those for whom law is ideology-believe, and want to
believe.
But the Bible (Psalms 146:7-9, N.E.B.) says,
The Lord feeds the hungry and sets the prisoner free.
The Lord ... straightens backs which are bent....
The Lord gives heart to the orphan and widow but turns the
course of the [strong] to their ruin.
Psalms Nine and Ten express this in a poem written by (or for) the
oppressed: "[F]or thou hast upheld my right and my cause, seated on
thy throne, thou righteous judge" (Psalms 9:4, N.E.B.). In this biblical
poetry, someone whose back is bent speaks for herself. She character-
izes the ideology of her oppressors-noting how the oppressors recog-
nize God but put Him at a distance, so that He does not interfere with
their arrangements, so that justice for the oppressed is pushed into the
afterlife. The modern Calvinist theologian Walter Brueggemann gives
this as the meaning of those Psalms:
[T]he powerful control the social discourse of the community, that
is, define the terms of social communication, and thereby manipu-
late social power and shape social relations to their own
advantage.' 7
"[R]aw, material power inevitably depends on the power of ideol-
ogy,"'" he says. But in the Psalms, the Lord is a third voice in a con-
flicted political argument; God takes sides; He disrupts political and
legal order. He confronts legal ideology, which protects the wealth of
the powerful and provides ease to the consciences of lawyers. Legal
ideology, then and now, is as characteristic of ecclesiastical domina-
tion as it is of domination of the poor by the government, and of the
government by the comfortable: The Lord confronts religion, because
religion is afraid to confront the rule of law.
17. Walter Brueggemann, Psalms 9-10: A Counter to Conventional Social Reality,
in The Psalms: The Life of Faith 227, nn.21 & 22 (Patrick D. Miller ed., 1995). I
mention lawyers here not as an aside but as a clear example of the ruling class in
bureaucratic capitalism. The organized American Bar has, of late, come to announce
an ideology of "professionalism" as its way to keep American lawyers from not being
accountable to the wider society: Professionalism, to the extent it has meaning be-
yond that claim, is defended, as are other elements of the bureaucratic ruling class, by
the appeal to expertise. "Experts are addicts," though, as LeCarre's Gerald Westerby
put it. "They are servants of whatever system hires them. They perpetuate it. When
we are tortured, we shall be tortured by experts. When we are hanged, experts will
hang us .... When the world is destroyed, it will be destroyed not by its madmen but
by the sanity of its experts." John LeCarre, Russia House 207 (1989). "These are the
sort of bureaucratic pen-pushers," Bernie Samson said, "who think a peace treaty is
more important than a peace." Deighton, supra note 9, at 269. William May gives the
point ethical focus in his Notes on the Ethics of Doctors and Lawyers (1977). My
friend and teacher Bob Rodes remembers a talk at Notre Dame in which Father Gus-
tavo Gutierrez characterized such piety as, "Our Father Who art in heaven-stay
there!"
18. Id.
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The rule of law is a dogma in American civil religion, but American
civil religion did not invent it. Brueggemann's colleague at the Pres-
byterian seminary in Georgia, Justo Gonzalez, shows how it began in
the Christian church as early as the Fourth Century, when texts such
as these Psalms were translated for Christians from prophetic witness
to an admonition to the poor-when the political power of such scrip-
tural texts was tamed by theologians. The moral problem posed by
wealth among the followers of Jesus thus became a problem not for
the wealthy, but for the poor, who were told by their Christian teach-
ers to accept their lot as the will of God: "Through this teaching the
burden of conscience tends to . . . be placed increasingly on those
whose material needs are so pressing that [the] preoccupation with
them is nearly inescapable .... [T]hat gentlemen oppress the poor...
[and] manifest their [own] concern with material things . . . is less
important.19
The Bible, read politically, tends to subvert legal order. For another
tamed example, familiar to Christians, consider St. Paul's use of "law"
in the Letter to the Church in Rome. Christian theologians have di-
luted St. Paul's meaning and encouraged anti-semitism by teaching
that "law" there refers only to contemporary Jewish law-to dietary
rules and circumcision. Suppose instead that he meant the law you
and I teach and write about. Then, as Mexican theologian Jose
Porfirio Miranda puts it, "Sin... has become structured into human
civilization itself, whose most characteristic and quintessential expres-
sion is the law."'  Our law, American law-school law.
19. Justo L. Gonzalez, Faith and Wealth 230 (1990). I have lately undertaken to
represent debtors and tenants in the systems American law maintains for summary
eviction and the garnishment of the wages of the working poor. I have learned not to
doubt the contemporary force of Gonzalez's characterization.
It is to the advantage of the ruling class to create the principle that people are born
into a legal order as well as into a culture, even though, in fact:
The "state" of the jurists is linked, despite its "ideological nature," to an
objective reality, just as the most fantastic dream is still based on reality ....
[The ruling class] has never... lost sight of the fact that class society is ...
the battlefield of a bitter class war, where the machinery of state represents a
very powerful weapon. On this battlefield, relations do not appear to be in
the least.., a minimal limitation of the freedom of the personality indispen-
sable to human coexistence.
Evgeny B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory 148-50 (1929) (Chris
Arthur ed., Barbara Einhorn trans., Pluto Press 1989); see also Catharine A. MacKin-
non, "Freedom from Unreal Loyalties": On Fidelity in Constitutional Interpretation, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1773 (1997) (arguing that fidelity to American constitutional law has
meaning only when such an assumption is examined and in some real sense found to
be valid).
20. Jose Porfirio Miranda, Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of
Oppression 204-05 (John Eagleson trans., 1974). According to Miranda, the object is
"to break definitively with all law and with all the human civilization that is supported
by the law." Id.; see also Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (1982); Charles C. Vest,
Marxist Ethics, in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics 368 (James F. Chil-
dress & John Macquarrie eds., 1986).
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In a similar way, in Psalms 9 and 10, the Lord takes the side of the
oppressed and turns the conflicted conversations Israel heard then,
and we hear now, under such deceitful labels as "welfare reform," into
cases in court which the Lord Himself judges. Brueggemann reads
these Psalms and imagines law as civil procedure: "[I]n this court-
room under the governance of [the Lord] . . . the usual power rela-
tions between the strong and the weak are interrupted, transformed,
and rectified, so that the weak and marginal speak here as they are
permitted to speak nowhere else."'" On to the merits, the Lord gives
legal judgment and applies stare decisis: "I will tell the story of [the
Lord's] marvelous acts. . . For the Avenger of blood has
remembered men's desire, and has not forgotten the cry of the poor"
(Psalms 9:1, 12).22
When I read Brueggemann's clever use of law-school arcana, I
thought of a recent survey of Indiana courts: The average time spent
on a case in small-claims court, which is where almost all summary
evictions and wage garnishments are obtained, is twelve minutes.
That's for cases the judges hear. If default judgments are considered,
the time is closer to twelve seconds-or maybe no time at all: In my
county, default judgments and wage garnishments are ordered without
a judge even being in the building.
The theological situation here-the relevance of religion for a law-
yer's work-resembles Marxist analysis-or, if you prefer, the analysis
of liberation theology:' The Psalms describe a society in which false
consciousness and the hegemonic ideology of the dominant class cus-
tomarily and conventionally prevail. Class warfare is described, there
and for us, in a voice otherwise suppressed in politics and the law, a
revolutionary voice that describes victory for the oppressed: "Thou
hast heard the lament of the humble, 0 Lord, and art attentive to
their heart's desire, bringing justice to the orphan and downtrodden
that fear may never drive [the poor] from their homes again" (Psalms
10:17-18).
Radical religion recognizes what the Marxists call alienation, the ef-
fect of oppression by the economically powerful, and a consequence
of the rule of law as the ideology of the oppressor. The person at the
bottom is denied identity: She exists for the purposes of others.
Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg quotes to this effect a medieval Jewish sage
[who quoted phrases from the Midrash on Genesis 29:11]: "The poor
[person] lacks an essential autonomy; he depends on others for his
sense of life. There is a 'fountain of life' that should flow from the
21. Brueggemann, supra note 17, at 220.
22. See id. at 221 (interpreting the quoted verse).
23. I emphasize Marxist analysis. It is difficult for a believer to follow the other
half of Marxist ideology-its teleology, its theory of how things will end up. Jews and
Christians do not envision a classless social order as the goal of their faith.
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self, unconditioned by the will of others. Without this organic inde-
pendence, a person is 'as though dead."'24
Such strains of biblical anger no doubt explain much of what Jews
mean when they talk about justice. Albert Vorspan referred to "the
Jewish passion for justice" and celebrated Louis D. Brandeis as "a
giant of justice" in America. 5 He meant something more scriptural
than the veil of ignorance-something more scriptural than demo-
cratic liberal equality.
Maimonides gives Zornberg's point about identity a poignant and
melancholy symbol: Jewish law attempts to restore lost identity when
the pauper is not only accounted dead, but is dead in fact: Jews bury
their dead, according to Maimonides, in an inexpensive shroud and
cover their faces-in both cases in order not to shame the poor
"whose faces," he said, "have turned livid as a result of
undernourishment."'
The relevance of religion to the work of a lawyer, as subversive
politics, then, is a challenge to the comfort of lawyers. The story of
liberation, from Exodus through the presence of the black church in
America, and the meaning of our sacred scripture say this to us:
Either be serious when you say (or sing) that our God is a God of
justice, that the Lord hears the cry of the poor, or don't bother to
suppose that religion has relevance for what lawyers do: "We have no
choice but to let our theology function in relation to socioeconomic
reality and power," Brueggemann says.27 "To deny this linkage is to
engage in self-deception. It is to imagine that when we interpret we
can preclude 'advocacy."'" He means the advocacy that tends to sub-
vert legal order.
Advocacy, in these religious readings, even when it does not mean
to, tends to subvert legal order.
24. Avivah Gottlieb Zornberg, Genesis: The Beginning of Desire 203 (1995).
25. Albert Vorspan, Giants of Justice (1960).
26. 111 The Code of Mairnonides (Mishneh Torah) 173-74 (1949).
27. Brueggemann, supra note 17, at 233 n.32.
28. Id
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